Will Biden’s Saudi Security Pact Spark a Nuclear Arms Race?

June 26th, 2024 - by The Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft

Will Biden’s Saudi Security Pact
Spark a Nuclear Arms Race?
The Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft

(June 24, 2024) — The Biden administration is reportedly close to finalizing a controversial security agreement with the Saudi kingdom. Beyond a contractual obligation to defend Saudi Arabia with American troops, the agreement also offers Riyadh American assistance in developing the nuclear fuel cycle.

This would grant the Saudis access to sensitive enrichment technology, which critics argue would put the kingdom on the brink of acquiring nuclear arms.

Given Washington’s long-standing policy of restricting the spread of enrichment technologies, Biden’s proposed deal is raising concerns in the global non-proliferation community.

What are the non-proliferation implications of the Saudi security pact? Given Saudi Arabia’s past expressed interest in developing nuclear weapons, can the deal guarantee that Riyadh won’t militarize its program down the road? Given the near-collapse of the Iran nuclear deal, can Biden’s offer to Saudi Arabia spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East?

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Timely and Important Discussion with:

Thomas Countryman
Thomas Countryman is the former Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, and Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN). Countryman served over 35 years as a Foreign Service Officer before retiring in 2017. Since then, he has served as Chairman of the Board of Directors for the Arms Control Association.

Ariel Petrovics
Ariel Petrovics is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute, a Research Fellow with Managing the Atom at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, and a Research Associate/Lecturer at University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy. Her book project compares foreign policy effectiveness for inducing nuclear reversal.

Robert Einhorn
Robert Einhorn is a senior fellow in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and the Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, both housed within the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. Before joining Brookings in May 2013, Einhorn served as the U.S. Department of State special advisor for nonproliferation and arms control.

James Walsh (Moderator)
James (Jim) Walsh is a Senior Research Associate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Security Studies Program (SSP). Walsh’s research and writings focus on nuclear weapons. He is one of the relatively small number of Americans who have travelled to both Iran and North Korea for talks with officials about nuclear issues.