Around 6 million Syrians sought safety in neighboring countries,
1 million in Germany alone. How many will return? 

The Regime’s End
Mel Gurtov / LA Progressive

(December 9, 2024) — They’re celebrating in the streets in Damascus. In a collapse as stunning and swift as that of the Soviet Union, the 24 years of Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship have come to an end. 

Within the past year, Assad’s regime seemed to have recovered some legitimacy. The Arab League reinstated Syria’s membership last year, and Saudi Arabia in May announced the appointment of its first ambassador since severing ties with Damascus twelve years ago.

All the signs pointed to the Syrian army’s full control of nearly all of the country. The rebellion seems to have escaped the notice of numerous governments, but now they will have to pay attention to what it might mean for Middle East politics and strategic alignments.

The rebellion against the regime originated in Syria’s civil war that began in 2011. That challenge to his rule, a chapter in the Arab Spring that also convulsed Tunisia and Egypt, led Assad to turn his regime into a police state, with tens of thousands of people jailed and many of them tortured. But the regime never fully secured the northwest of the country. In a matter of weeks, the rebel offensive captured the country’s largest city, Aleppo and the rest of the northwest. Now it controls Damascus. At least three forces appear to comprise the rebellion, with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), whose name means Organization for the Liberation of the Levant, the most important.

The civil war has displaced about half of the population. Around 6 million people sought safety in neighboring countries and Europe, 1 million in Germany alone. How many of these people will return? Will the European Union and other governments force them to return?

Probably not many Syrians will want to go home initially; they will probably wait to see what kind of regime the rebel leaders create. Moreover, the end of the Assad regime may not mean the end of instability, since the other rebel groups may seek to maintain control over territory they have seized.

The Uncertain Futurre
In an interview with CNN, the leader of the rebel group, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, said little about his goals other than to overthrow the Assad regime and establish a pluralistic society. But the HTS’s Islamist roots and Jolani’s one-time fighting for al-Qaeda led the US and other countries in 2018 to label Hayat Tahrir al-Sham a terrorist organization.

Will that tag remain now that HTS is in charge? It is likely to be hostile to Iran, but its future relations with Israel and Syria’s Arab neighbors are open to speculation. Israel has seized the buffer zone it shares with Syria, and reports say it has an eye on other Syrian territory. That spells trouble.

Russia and Iran are the big losers in Syria’s collapse. Both have lost a key Middle East ally. At first, Russian planes reportedly bombed rebel positions in support of al-Assad, but then reports from Moscow said that Putin was disgusted with the retreat of Syria’s army and would not try to save his regime. Russia ordered its citizens to leave Syria. Iran did the same, closing down not only its embassy but also its military facilities.

Russia’s foreign minister met with Iran’s and Turkey’s ministers in search of a diplomatic resolution to the conflict, but events overcame that effort. By then, Assad and his family were preparing to flee the country—to Moscow, it turns out.

As for the US, the Biden administration—and Donald Trump—made clear as the rebellion unfolded that the US would not and should not be involved. That is sensible, since virtually nothing is known about what Syria will look like under the new regime. However, the US is involved in Syria: There are around 900 US soldiers and contract personnel working with the Kurdish forces in northern Syria, and Biden revealed US air strikes against ISIS units in Syria which, he contends, may try to take advantage of the chaos.

Will the new Syrian government allow those missions to continue? Or will they undermine a US interest in assisting Syria’s economy? Assad had made himself respectable by throwing the doors open to foreign investors and tourists. An HTS-led government seems unlikely to do that, but it might welcome US economic aid.

More Questions Than Answers
Among the other unknowns: What kind of government will the HST form, and how will that government behave with respect to human rights–women’s rights in particular? Will the new regime seek revenge against officials who worked for Assad’s government rather than make use of their skills?

What will happen to Syria’s stockpile of chemical weapons–sarin and mustard gas that the regime used against its own citizens? What will the Kurdish militia that has US support now do, since it was part of the anti-Assad rebellion? Will Iran turn full attention to Hezbollah, which has been further weakened by Syria’s collapse, or will Hezbollah be left on its own while Iran struggles to adjust to the new strategic reality?

Likewise, how will Russia react to this sudden turn of events? Its foreign ministry regards HTS as a terrorist organization. Will Syria be another Afghanistan for Moscow?

Rebel groups that seize power invariably get caught between conflicting aims on the use of their new authority: revenge or governing? HTS could wind up being another jihadist regime, bent on eliminating enemies and building an authoritarian state; or it could focus on human security and friendly relations with all its neighbors. We’ll probably find out soon enough which path HTS is going to take.